

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TEDDY MOORE,

Plaintiff,

-against-

STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH; HEALTH FIRST,

Defendants.

21-CV-7805 (LTS)

ORDER

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

By order dated May 8, 2013, Judge Loretta A. Preska, in her capacity as Chief Judge, barred Plaintiff from filing any new action *in forma pauperis* (IFP) without first obtaining from the Court leave to file. *See Moore v. Bramwell*, ECF 1:13-CV-0831, 7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2013). Judge Preska issued that order in response to Plaintiff's filing numerous cases that had been dismissed as frivolous. *Id.*

Plaintiff filed this action *pro se*, seeking IFP status, and without seeking leave from the Court to file this action. On September 21, 2021, the Court therefore dismissed the complaint for Plaintiff's failure to first obtain permission to file this action in accordance with the Court's March 8, 2013 order. On September 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed a letter motion for reconsideration challenging the September 21, 2021 dismissal order. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff denies being barred from filing any civil action without obtaining leave from the Court to file. (*Id.* at ¶ 2.)

The Court liberally construes this submission as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend judgment and a motion under Local Civil Rule 6.3 for reconsideration, and, in the alternative, as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from a judgment or order. *See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006); *see also Tracy v. Freshwater*, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (The solicitude afforded to *pro se* litigants takes a

variety of forms, including liberal construction of papers, “relaxation of the limitations on the amendment of pleadings,” leniency in the enforcement of other procedural rules, and “deliberate, continuing efforts to ensure that a *pro se* litigant understands what is required of him”) (citations omitted). After reviewing the arguments in Plaintiff’s submission, the Court denies the motion.

DISCUSSION

The standards governing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 are the same. *R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So*, 640 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The movant must demonstrate that the Court overlooked “controlling law or factual matters” that had been previously put before it. *Id.* at 509 (discussion in the context of both Local Civil Rule 6.3 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)); *see Padilla v. Maersk Line, Ltd.*, 636 F. Supp. 2d 256, 258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “Such motions must be narrowly construed and strictly applied in order to discourage litigants from making repetitive arguments on issues that have been thoroughly considered by the court.” *Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp.*, 90 F. Supp. 2d 390, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); *see also SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc.*, 642 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“A motion for reconsideration is not an invitation to parties to ‘treat the court’s initial decision as the opening of a dialogue in which that party may then use such a motion to advance new theories or adduce new evidence in response to the court’s ruling.’”) (internal quotation and citations omitted).

A review of the Court’s order in *Moore*, ECF 1:13-CV-0831, 7, makes clear that Plaintiff is barred from filing any new action IFP without first obtaining leave from the Court. Plaintiff has therefore failed to demonstrate in his motion that the Court overlooked any controlling decisions or factual matters with respect to the dismissed action. Plaintiff’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 is therefore denied.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), a party may seek relief from a district court's order or judgment for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason justifying relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

The Court has considered Plaintiff's arguments, and even under a liberal interpretation of his motion, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of the grounds listed in the first five clauses of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) apply. Therefore, the motion under any of these clauses is denied.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), the motion is also denied. “[A] Rule 60(b)(6) motion must be based upon some reason other than those stated in clauses (1)-(5).” *United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien*, 588 F.3d 158, 175 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting *Smith v. Sec'y of HHS*, 776 F.2d 1330, 1333 (6th Cir. 1985)). A party moving under Rule 60(b)(6) cannot circumvent the one-year limitation applicable to claims under clauses (1)-(3) by invoking the residual clause (6) of Rule 60(b). *Id.* A Rule 60(b)(6) motion must show both that the motion was filed within a “reasonable time” and that “‘extraordinary circumstances’ [exist] to warrant relief.” *Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Pac. Fin. Servs. of America, Inc.*, 301 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). See *Ackermann v. United States*, 340 U.S. 193, 199-202 (1950).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 5) is denied.

Plaintiff's case in this Court under Docket No. 21-CV-7805 is closed. The Court will only accept for filing documents that are directed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. If Plaintiff files other documents that are frivolous or meritless, the Court will direct Plaintiff to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further documents in this action.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. *Cf. Coppededge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 27, 2021
New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge